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This paper derives new results on the e¤ects of employing Taylor
rules in economies that are subject to real-market imperfections such
as production externalities. It suggests that rules which should be
avoided (chosen) in perfect markets environments do in fact ensure
(yield) unique (multiple) rational expectations solutions in alterna-
tive settings. Therefore, exact knowledge on the degree of market
imperfection is pivotal for robust policy advice.
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11 Introduction
The Taylor (1993) rule provides a good description of how many central
banks attempt to set interest rates in order to achieve stable prices while
avoiding large ‡uctuations in output and employment. There is increasing
evidence, however, that Taylor rules can be a source of economic instabil-
ity by themselves. For example, Benhabib et al. (2001) demonstrate that
steering under such policy may introduce real indeterminacy in an otherwise
determinate economy. These sunspot equilibria imply that cycles arise sim-
ply because agents believe in their existence. As a consequence, the Taylor
rule debate frequently advises the monetary authority to assign aggressive
backward-looking principles in which interest rates respond to predetermined
variables, in particular to in‡ation (see for example Calmstrom and Fuerst,
1999).
The present paperquali…es thisassertion by suggesting that before spelling
out concrete policy rules, the monetary authority must …rst be au courant
with the speci…c environment of the economy. In particular, it demonstrates
that the presence of mild forms of market imperfections – arising from pro-
duction externalities, for example – may have fundamental consequences on
how monetary policy should be conducted.
The motivation for the current research stemsfromthe insights of recently
formulated dynamic general equilibrium models with sunspot equilibria and
self-ful…lling prophecies.1 In these models the possibility of a continuum of
equilibria is the consequence of empirically plausible market imperfections –
therefore, sunspot equilibria are more than theoretical curiosities. However,
these models remain in the con…nes of real (i.e. non-monetary) economies.
The current paper augments these models by introducing money in order to
examine the e¤ects of monetary policy on indeterminacy as well assess to
assess monetary policy recommendations in suboptimal economies.
Indeterminacy economies are always Pareto-ine¢cient because they are
linked to some form of market imperfection. Their presence calls for three
possible general policy strategies: (i) policies that promote optimism, (ii)
policies that bump the economy towards better equilibria or (iii) policies
that eliminate coordination failures altogether. The current essay concerns
itself primarily with point (iii). In particular, it stresses the pertinence of
1A non-exhaustive list includes Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), Christiano and Harri-
son (1999), Farmer and Guo (1994), Perli (1998), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), Weder
(1998, 2001), and Wen (1998).
2Taylor rules in suboptimal environments. I will inspect monetary policies in
economies that display endogenous ‡uctuations independently of policy and
will o¤er strategies to eliminate sunspots’ aptitude.2
The main …ndings can be stated as follows: by responding su¢ciently
to output movements in setting the nominal interest rate, the monetary au-
thority can stabilize the (sunspot-driven) economy. The reasoning is that the
nominal interest rate operates like an in‡ation tax. By the central bank …ght-
ing output ‡uctuations, sunspot blips will be dimmed: when the central bank
builds up the costs of buoyant expectations these will no longer be sustain-
able in the …rst place. The result is related to Guo and Lansing (1998) and
Christiano and Harrison (1999) who establish that non-fundamental equilib-
ria stemming fromincreasing returns can be removed by progressive taxation.
The tax mechanism operates by intercepting the e¤ects of high increasing re-
turns to scale – quite similar to the Taylor design that is discussed here.
I also …nd that Taylor rules work quite di¤erently depending on the fun-
damentals of the economy. In fact, it appears to be the case that rules which
should be avoided (chosen) in perfect markets environments do in fact yield
unique (multiple) rational expectations solutions in alternative settings. For
example, backward-looking policy settings that ensure unique rational ex-
pectations in cases of constant returns to scale often are the ones connected
to determinacy at moderate imperfections and vice versa. Consequently, the
central bank should have a clear picture of market imperfections before set-
ting policy rules. Unfortunately, existing empirical studies do not provide an
unambiguous answer on the extent of the imperfections.
The paper is primarily concerned with backward-looking rules, however,
it will also demonstrate that forward-looking, current-looking and hybrid
rules imply similar results.
The argument which is developed in the current paper is framed within a
fully speci…ed environment which has been shown by Calmstrom and Fuerst
(2000) to have fundamentally di¤erent policy implications than (ad hoc)
New-IS-LM-frameworks.3 My study di¤ers from theirs in two important as-
pects, however. First, their production technology is constant returns to
scale. By contrast, I allow empirically plausible production externalities
which lead to increasing returns. Second, in their model the central bank’s
2The framework I will draw on is Wen (1998) which is currently the most success-
ful attempt in terms of obtaining sunspot equilibria at small increasing returns and in
generating realistic business cycles. See also Benhabib and Wen (2002).
3King (2000) is a good review of the New IS-LM model.
3nominal interest rate target responds to in‡ation only whereas the current
paper considers a Taylor formula in which the rate is increased or decreased
according to what is happening to both real GDP and in‡ation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model
economy. Section 3 discusses the connection of monetary policy, market
imperfections and sunspot equilibria. Section 4 discusses implications and
concludes.
2 The economy
The physical setup of the economy’s real part is a standard real business cycle
model augmented by production complementarities. Currency is introduced
by imposing restrictions on the timing of exchanges.
2.1 Preferences and technologies





t(lnct ¡ ´lt) 0 < ¯ < 1, ´ > 0
where ¯, ct and lt are the discount factor, consumption and labor during
t.4 The household rents labor and capital services to …rms. All markets are
perfectly competitive. The household’s budget constraint can be stated as
Mt+1 + Ptkt+1 = Mt + ¦t + Ptwtlt + Pt(rt + 1 ¡ ±t)kt ¡ Ptct + Nt(Rt ¡ 1)
where Pt is the price level, Mt are the cash balances at the beginning of t, wt
is the real wage and rt is the real rental rate of capital, kt. The variable ut
denotes the degree of capital utilization. The depreciation rate of installed






t µ > 1:
Nt stands for one-period bank deposits which pay a short-term nominal inter-
est given by Rt. ¦t is the pro…t ‡ow from…rms and intermediaries. A positive
4Indivisible labor is standard in real business cycle modelling.
4value is assigned to the inconvertible currency by assuming that during the
shopping session the household is subject to the cash-in-advance-restriction
Mt + Ptwtlt ¡Nt ¸ Ptct;
that is, consumption expenditures must be covered by money holdings and
by wage payments.
Output is produced by a large number of competitive …rms with identical
technologies. The economy as a whole is a¤ected by organizational synergies
that cause the output of an individual …rm to be higher if all other …rms in
the economy are producing more. The term At stands for these aggregate
externalities. The production complementarities are taken as given for the
individual optimizer and they cannot be priced or traded. Deviations from






i;t At = (utkt)
®l
1¡®
t and 0 < ® < 1:
Here, kt (lt) denotes – by way of normalization – the economy-wide average
capital (labor) input. Lastly, …rms must acquire cash borrowed at the short
term rate from an intermediate sector to …nance their wage bills.
2.2 Intermediaries and central banking
The monetary branch of the economy comes in two parts: the intermediary
sector and the central bank. The perfectly competitive intermediary has two
sources of cash – deposits by households and lump-sum central bank-issued
currency, Ms
t+1 ¡Ms






Most central banks implement monetary policy by controlling a short-
term nominal interest rate. Accordingly, it has become standard to represent
monetary policy in terms of commitment to a rule for the nominal rate of
interest. In the present paper, the monetary authority sets the short-run
5See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and others for an alternative (and in reduced-form
equivalent) formulation that incorporates internal increasing returns at the intermediate-
…rm level in an imperfectly competitive market structure without free entry. In that case,
the parameter ° would (also) relate to the monopoly markup.
5nominal interest rate based on what is happening to both real GDP and








¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0
or in linearized from
b Rt+1 = ¿b ¼t + !b yt
in which the variables appear as percentage deviations from their stationary
states R, ¼ and y. We denote rules with ¿ < 1 (¿ > 1) as passive (aggressive)
since the nominal interest rate moves less (more) than one-for-one with in‡a-
tion. If ¿ = 1, the nominal rate of interest responds one-for-one to changes
in actual in‡ation and the policy is neutral. The term b yt is interpretable as
the output gap and ! refers to the weight given to deviations of real GDP
from a normal level. Since the general equilibrium setting imposes a money
demand relationship (that is, the cash-in-advance setup), the interest rate
rule implies that the money supply is endogenous.
2.3 Dynamics and calibration
In what follows, I restrict the analysis to a symmetric equilibrium in which


















































6Equation (1) describes the leisure-consumption trade-o¤ and (2) pins down
the optimal utilization rate of capital. Equations (3) and (4) are the usual
Fisher and Euler conditions. (5) repeats the intertemporal constraint. No
closed-form solution exists, thus the model must be approximated. In log-























The dynamical system contains two non-predetermined (or jump) variables:
Etb ct+1 and Et b Rt+2. Therefore, indeterminacy requires that at most one eigen-
value of the 4£4-matrix M is outside the unit circle. Two eigenvalues larger
than one (and two smaller than one) imply determinacy. If, say, only one
eigenvalue is outside the unit circle, then there are multiple rational expec-


























with ³t+1 being an arbitrary random variable with Et³t+1 = 0.
I will now assign parameter values and demonstrate the empirical plau-
sibility of sunspot equilibria. The time unit is taken to be a quarter of a
year. The calibration is based on empirical observations on post-war U.S.
data. The capital share, ®, is set equal to 30 percent, the discount factor, ¯;
is chosen to be 0:99 and the steady state rate of capital depreciation, ±, is 2:5
percent. The parameter µ can then be derived from steady state conditions
µ =
1=¯ ¡1 + ±
±
:
When abstracting from the monetary side, the calibration implies mini-
mum increasing returns to scale needed for indeterminacy that amount to
1:10368175 which is reasonable value. For example, Caballero and Lyons
(1992) obtain increasing returns estimates in the order of 1.26 to 1.56. Bax-
ter and King (1991) …nd returns to scale of 1.53, however, combined with
a standard error of 0.56. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) report
7a point estimate of 0.98. Again their standard error of 0.34 is large. Basu
and Fernald (1997) also …nd close to constant returns, however, the imparted
estimation-uncertainty is signi…cant again.
The reasoning for the multiplicity is as follows. Equations (2) and (5)
entail the reduced form-output







Thus, the e¤ective labor-output elasticity is larger than unity for6
° >
®(µ ¡1)
® + (1 ¡ ®)µ
> 0:
Accordingly, the reduced-form labor demand curve is upward sloping at mild
increasing returns.7
Now, how do sunspot equilibria come about? Suppose agents suddenly
have pessimistic expectations and expect lower future consumption. The
permanent income motive will reduce today’s consumption as well. Then,
the static-…rst order condition (1) implies that the labor supply schedule
moves out (left-hand-side expressions are marginal utilities). However, given
the upward sloping equilibrium labor demand curve, employment and invest-
ment will actually both fall today. As a consequence, the future capital stock,
output and consumption will all be low and the initially pessimistic expecta-
tions self-ful…lled. The sunspot movement must be stationary by de…nition.
In the model, decreasing capital utilization costs will ultimately bring the
contraction to a halt and revert the cycle’s direction. This is similar to the
accelerator-multiplier e¤ect in ad hoc models.
3 How should monetary policy be conducted?
This section discusses the e¤ects of two versions of the Taylor rule on the
qualitative dynamics of the arti…cial economy. It opens by assuming that the
central bank sets nominal interest rates after having observed (past) in‡ation
and output.
6If the depreciation costs are high (µ ! 1) and accordingly capital utilization is set
constant by agents, the condition reduces to the same as the one found by Harrison and
Weder (2002).
7Upward sloping labor demand arises for ° > 0:094488189, thus the condition is not a
su¢cient one for indeterminacy. When formulating the model in continuous time, the two
tresholds converge.
83.1 Indeterminacy zones with backward-looking rules
I will start combing for parametric indeterminacy zones by considering a
constant returns to scale technology (° = 0) which will help in understanding
other cases. When I set ! = 0, the four eigenvalues of M are8
½








The eigenvalues are the same as those reported in Calmstrom and Fuerst
(2000) despite the absence of variable capital utilization and depreciation in
their model. The eigenvalue-expressions expose the policy’s direct impact on
dynamics: policy-induced indeterminacy can be avoided simply by aggres-
sively responding to past in‡ation (¿ > 1) whereas passive responses lead to
multiplicity (¿ < 1).9 The reasoning for the occurrence of sunspot equilibria
can be understood as follows: suppose that current in‡ation increases by
one percent, which given an aggressive policy, implies that the t + 1 nomi-
nal rate goes up by more than one percent. As a consequence, the in‡ation
tax depresses future consumption and lifts current consumption – the real
rate goes down. This, however, is only possible when the rate of in‡ation,
¼t+1, increases. As a result, the central bank’s target Rt+2 rises by even
more and policy induces an unsustainable explosive in‡ation-pattern. The
initial rise in in‡ation is not supported and consequently the sunspot cycle
is stopped. Clearly, if the bank follows a passive policy, the chain of events
remains stationary.
Now, suppose that the central bank reacts in parts to past movements
in output, ! > 0. Dynamics can be derived analytically within a simpli…ed
version without capital and in which output is produced with the linear
technology
yt = Alt:
The model reduces to the scalar equation
Et b Rt+2 = (¿ ¡ !)b Rt+1:
8It is reasonable to assume that 0 < ± < 1.
9The …rst (second) eigenvalue is outside (inside) the unit circle. Unfortunately, by
introducing ! 6= 0 or ° 6= 0, the respective expressions become ”not very practical” and I
will therefore derive some results numerically.
9Indeterminacy arises for
! ¡ 1 < ¿ < ! + 1: (6)
The right-hand-side inequality in (6) repeats the afore-mentioned result.
Namely that active in‡ation-…ghting policies eliminate sunspot equilibria.
More generally, the central bank must simultaneously select both policy pa-
rameters as there exists an intermediate range of ¿ values that generates
indeterminacy for given !. For example, letting ! = 1:5, the bank’s output-
coupled response must fall outside ¿ 2 (1=2;2:5) otherwise policy-induced
cycles crop up.
Figure 1 shows regions of indeterminacy when including endogenous cap-
ital accumulation while varying the two Taylor-parameters with ¿ measured
on the horizontal axis and ! measured on the vertical axis. In this more gen-
eral case, the left-hand-side boundary in (6) becomes a nonlinear function
of the other model parameters. Moreover, it moves up into regions that are
not relevant in the sense of observed monetary policies.10 Therefore, Figure
1 plots only the lower boundary. It again calls for the central bank to not be
too aggressive in curbing output ‡uctuations as this would create endogenous
cycles by itself.
The indeterminacy arises as follows. Suppose that current in‡ation heats
up. Accordingly, Rt+1 rises. The in‡ation tax raises current consumption,
yet the labor supply curve shifts inward which, since the capital stock is
given, lowers current output. The initial rise in in‡ation is not supported as
long as the output-related interest rate reaction is weak: there are two e¤ects
acting on the interest rate





If ! is small, then equilibrium sequences are explosive and sunspot equilibria
are not possible. However, larger !-weights imply that the interest rate
movement is checked and stationary equilibrium sunspot-driven sequences
materialize.
Next, I turn to cases in which the economy is imperfect and subject to
real indeterminacy stemming from production externalities. The question
10For example, if ¿ is set at 1:5, then ! > 56:84582 is needed to transform the economy
back into one of determinacy (at ¿ = 1 we require ! > 45:47665 and at ¿ = 1=2 ! >
34:10749).
10I ask is: can the central bank stamp out sunspot equilibria by choosing
an appropriate Taylor-design? I will again begin by assuming that ! = 0.
This is the frequently considered case (for example Calmstrom and Fuerst,
2000, and others, who, however, assume constant returns to scale). Acting
passively, ¿ < 1, leaves the qualitative dynamics una¤ected (Figure 2). At
the neutral position ¿ = 1, the minimum increasing returns are °min =
0:103708061, which is essentially the number that arises in the nonmonetary
version. At ¿ = 1:5, the minimum degree of scale economies becomes ° =
0:103716838, thus the quantitative e¤ect of policy is imperceptible. When
the central bank reacts to in‡ationary movements, indeterminacy arising
from production externalities cannot be eliminated.
I therefore shift attention to cases involving ! > 0. Figure 1’s qualita-
tive results remain unchanged. To see this, consider the case of increasing
returns low enough to not generate externalities-a¢liated indeterminacy, say
° = 0:05. Figure 3 indicates that sunspot equilibria are linked to policy in
very much the same way as under constant returns. However, the vertical
borderline between determinacy and indeterminacy shifts down slightly: it
places a slightly more stringent cap on !.
Let us now step up ° to 0:11 such that production complementarities
induce sunspot equilibria in environments without money. The speci…c value
draws on Benhabib and Wen (2002) who propose it by observing that the
model’s cycle frequency matches that of U.S. output. Furthermore, the mag-
nitude of scale economies falls into the scope of the studies mentioned in
Section 2.3.
Figure 4 pins down the policy advice under the assumption of °min. The
only way for the central bank to tackle endogenous cycles is now by working
against output movements. If ! = 0, indeterminacy always occurs. Further-
more, Figure 4 shows that for any given ¿, the output-related response must
be su¢ciently large to obtain unique solutions. Moreover, even when ! takes
on strictly positive values, the speci…c choice of ¿ may imply every of the
three possible regimes (indeterminacy, determinacy or source – in which the
latter region may imply endogenous and deterministic cycles on its own).
The result is reminiscent of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Christiano and
Harrison (1998) who …nd that progressive tax systems e¤ectively eliminate
indeterminacy by taxing away increasing returns. The Taylor policy sug-
gested here fabricates a similar device. If ! is su¢ciently large, then output
‡uctuations that arise from believing in them simply become too costly. Let
us walk through a sunspot sequence that is stopped by the central bank for
11further understanding of the result. Suppose that agents embellish optimistic
expectations without any real cause. By projecting high future consumption,
they will ratchet up today’s consumption expenditures. The high increasing
returns will increase today’s employment and output as a result of the up-
ward sloping equilibrium labor demand curve. Now, if the output response
of the central bank is strong enough, then Rt+1 will increase and the initially
sanguine expectations will be intercepted by an in‡ation tax that reduces
future consumption. The initially optimistic expectations are not ful…lled
and the sunspot cycle is broken. To conclude, the discussion of backward-
looking rules suggests that central banks should be very careful about the
speci…c economic environment when setting policy rules. I will next turn to
forward-looking rules.
3.2 Forward looking rules?
It may be suspected that the result is dependent on assuming a backward-
looking policy rule. Yet, the general picture that Taylor rules settings should
consider technology does not change when the central bank pays attention
to expected values such as in
b Rt = ¿Etb ¼t+1 + !Etb yt+1 ¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0:
















Beginning with the case of ! = ° = 0, the three eigenvalues of J are
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which reverses the results obtained under backward-looking rules: all policy
responses ¿ > 1 are precluded, so it is necessary for policy to be passive in
Taylor’s sense. Let us turn to cases involving ! > 0. Resorting again to a
linear production technology without capital leads to the simpli…ed model




12from which more general Taylor formulas can be discussed analytically: de-
terminacy requires
¿ > ! ¡ 1 for ¿ < !
or
¿ < ! + 1 for ¿ > !:
Now there are two zones of indeterminacy. Again, if ! = 0, the monetary
authority should be passive when responding to expected in‡ation. If ¿ =
0, the monetary authority should be passive when responding to expected
output. This insight essentially carries over when weights are given to both
in‡ation and real GDP. Weights given to both variables should be similar and
extreme (in the sense of aggressive) responses will likely drive the economy
into sunspot districts.
Let us now consider the more general case with capital accumulation.
As long as the central bank sets ¿ < 1, indeterminacy does not arise with
constant returns as in Calmstrom and Fuerst (2002).11 The result carries
over to ° < °min. However, once increasing returns are stronger it becomes
even harderforthecentral bank toprevent technology-induced indeterminacy
than in the backward-looking case. Figure 5 identi…es ¿ ¡ !¡combinations
that achieve the goal and it demonstrates the di¢culty in …nding the right
mix.12 As was the case with backward-looking policies, ! = 0, indeterminacy
always commences. Suppose that production externalities are ° = 0:11.
Thus, suppose that the central bank sets
¿ = 1:5 and ! = 0:2
then sunspot cycles are ostracized (they are not if ¿ < 1). However, if the
scales-estimate that the central bank is acting on turns out to be incorrect,
the policy may be chosen wrongly: at slightly smaller externalities, say at
° = 0:10, indeterminacy commences.13
11There exists the possibilty for indeterminacy for very large !-values, numerically ex-
ceeding 26.
12The area below (above) the determinacy region involves two (three) eigenvalues inside
the unit root.
13There is an alternative way to see how forward looking rules do not contribute in
obtaining robust advise. For example, ¿ = 1:5 and ! = 0:5 designs indeterminacy for ° <
0:1005439 and ° > 0:102707401. Yet the small (but empirically plausible) intermediate
measure of increasing returns 0:1005439 < ° < 0:102707401 implies uniqueness.
13The lesson from this Section is parallel to the backward-looking case.
When set appropriately, Taylor rules may automatically stabilize the econ-
omy. However, the presence of increasing returns signi…cantly changes con-
crete policy proposals.
3.3 A case against current looking rules and a (partial)
case for them
Let us next consider current looking rules of the form
b Rt = ¿b ¼t + !b yt ¿ ¸ 0 ! ¸ 0:










Et b Rt+1 = 0:
Assuming ! = 0, indeterminacy carries over when capital is included and
production is constant returns since the dynamical system produces the three
eigenvalues
½




1 ¡¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ±)
;0
¾
of which the last two are always inside the unit circle. Since the underlying
dynamical system involves two jump variables, the economy is always subject
to indeterminacy. Numerical simulations suggest that allowing a rule in
which the nominal rate responds to in‡ation and output delivers the same
result. Therefore, the upshot from this appears to be a clear case against
using current looking rules.
However, the picture changes when ° > °min. Figure 6 plots determinacy
regions for ° = 0:11. Now there exists an area in which applying a current
looking Taylor rule can eliminate sunspot equilibria. In a nutshell, the central
bank must react su¢ciently to both output and in‡ation. Thus, current
looking rules may be a vehicle to eliminate sunspot ‡uctuations, yet, the
central bank must be con…dent that increasing returns exist otherwise these
Taylor settings always lead to indeterminacy.
143.4 A note on nominal interest rate smoothing
Empirical studies on the Taylor rule generally include the lagged interest
rate. Therefore, let us consider Taylor-type rules such as
b Rt = ½b Rt¡1 + ¿Etb ¼t+1 + !b yt
in which the parameter ½ stands for interest rate smoothing (the formulation
applies Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s, 1998, baseline case). Generally, the esti-
mates …nd a high degree of inertia displayed by central bank policy rules and
slightly greater than one-for-one increases in the nominal rate in response to
in‡ation. Furthermore, the response to the output gap is mostly found to be
small for the U.S. post-1980 period. Thus, let us consider the case ! = 0 and
constant returns to scale. The following four eigenvalues depict the dynamics
½
















(the dynamical systeminvolves two jump variables). The …rst two eigenvalues
split around the unit circle. If ½ = 0; the third eigenvalue is zero and the
policy should be passive; of course, this argument simply repeats a …nding
on forward-looking rules (Section 3.2.). Now by making ½ positive, the last





and cross the unit circle at
½
00 = 1 ¡ ¿
depending on
1 ? 4¿(1 ¡ ¿)
which happens …rst. In any case, we see from the ½00-condition, that setting
purely on a passive rule does no longer guarantee determinacy since, ceteris
paribus, increasing values of ½ pushes the economy out of the determinacy
region. Empirical evidence points to policies such as ½ ¼ 0:85 and ¿ ¼ 1:1,
15thus the analysis suggests that the central bank should avoid these poli-
cies for not creating endogenous ‡uctuations.14 The central bank can dodge
indeterminacy by aggressively acting upon output ‡uctuations: ½ = 0:85,
¿ = 1:1 and ! > 2:5237 yield unique equilibria. However, this large !-value
is at variance with empirically observed responses by the Federal Reserve,
the Bundesbank and other central banks. Moreover, it can be shown that
any such aggressive !-policy is without qualitative e¤ects on indeterminacy
if ° = 0:11 – repeating the central bank’s dilemma as outlined above.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and
Benhabib et al. (2003) have suggested that backward-looking Taylor rules’
performancescan beimproved by adding lagged valuesof thenominal interest
rate. In particular, they …nd that the rule
b Rt+1 = ½b Rt + ¿b ¼t ½ > 1
delivers unique equilibria. Let us again consider constant returns to scale and
capital accumulation (the above mentioned papers abstract from capital).
The dynamics are characterized by the four eigenvalues
½








The parameters ¿ and ½ enter in complementary fashion and determinacy
simply requires that ¿+½ > 1 (the underlyingdynamical systemhastwojump
variables). Thus, ½ > 1 is a su¢cient condition for ruling out indeterminacy.
However, the advice given by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Giannoni
and Woodford (2002) and Benhabib et al. (2003) is no longer valid once
market imperfections are present: no (¿;½)-constellation delivers determinacy
at ° = 0:11. Once again, the presence of market imperfections has nontrivial
e¤ects on the design of monetary policy. Setting the interest rate based
on what is happening to real GDP may slash sunspot forces, however: the
(½;¿;!)-triplet (0:85;1:1;0:95) constitutes a policy that delivers determinacy
at real market imperfections.
4 Implications and conclusion
The recent literature on Taylor rules has suggested that the monetary au-
thority should adopt aggressive, backward-looking rules. However, there are
14See for example Walsh (2002).
16limitations to any generalized proposals once market imperfections are a pos-
sibility. Then, the interest rate’s response to output may turn out material
to actively rule out indeterminacy arising from production externalities and
it is therefore instrumental for the central bank to take into account the tech-
nological regime before tuning policy parameters. Recall Figures 1 and 4 on
backward-looking Taylorformulas. Choosing rulesto the Southeast decreases
the likelihood that the central bank may induce indeterminacy in constant
returns environments. However, it is exactly that area that should be avoided
by the central bank when increasing returns to scale are present. In fact, the
(numerical) analysis suggeststhat there appears to be no ¿¡!¡combinations
that yield determinacy in both settings. For example, Taylor (1993) recom-
mended that ¿ and ! be set equal to 1.5 and 1/2 in his original study and, in
fact, that very policy implies the bank found a successful code of stabilizing
sunspot ‡uctuations with a backward-looking rule at ° = 0:11. However, if
increasing returns are slightly smaller (at ° = 0:10), then the economy skids
into a regime under the clout of sunspots. Alternative Taylor rule formula-
tions (forward-looking, current-looking and hybrid) involve parallel results.
In summary, essential information on how monetary design should be
framed in practice must be inferred from empirical estimates of market im-
perfections. Unfortunately, the existing work on this issue does not o¤er
a clear cut answer – the measurement of the degree of increasing returns
is simply too imprecise – which given my results poses a dilemma for the
central bank. Cole and Ohanian (1999) suggest a basic problem for this am-
biguity: insu¢cient variations in factor inputs. They conclude that currently
available methods are not adequate to return estimates of scale economies
such that we can eventually draw a conclusive diagnosis against or in favor
of models with indeterminacy such as those summarized in footnote 1. I
conclude that estimates currently available are also not adequate to square
con‡icting Taylor policy proposals.
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5 Appendix
























Calibrating ´, ®, ±;¯;l determines c=y, u, y=k, µ, R and ¼. Yet, not all these
are needed in the approximated version of the model with is the collection
of seven equations
b yt = ®(1 + °)b ut + ®(1 + °)b kt + (1 ¡ ®)(1 + °)b lt
b lt = b yt ¡b ct + b Rt
µb ut = b yt ¡ b kt
¡b ct ¡ b Rt




Etb yt+1 ¡ b kt+1
i
¡ ¯±Etµb ut+1







20b Rt + b ct = Etb ¼t+1 + Etb ct+1
The backward-oriented rule
b Rt+1 = ¿b ¼t + !b yt
together with the Fisher-equation implies






b yt+1 + Etb ct+1:















































































M ´ [M1 + M2R]
¡1[M3 + M4R]
and M is 4 £4. Forward-looking rules
b Rt = ¿Etb ¼t+1 + !Etb yt+1
21imply the Fisher-equation






b yt+1 + Etb ct+1:















The matrix J is 3 £ 3. A current looking rule
b Rt = ¿b ¼t + !b yt
implies the Fisher-equation






b yt+1 + Etb ct+1















W is 3 £ 3. Finally, the hybrid rule















































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Indeterminacy regions: current-looking rules
25